Introduction

1
When do ideas become so convincing they overcome past policy practices? This chapter examines the phenomenon of alternate paradigm construction in the case of early childhood education and care (ECEC). Government spending on child care and pre-primary education programs, as both a percentage of GDP and on a per child basis, has increased significantly over the past decade in most OECD countries (See Tables 1, 2 , and 3). In most countries, overall ECEC provision rates (see Table 4 ) have grown; more children are in non-parental child care and pre-primary programs in the early 2000s than in the late 1980s. Despite this broad pattern of convergence, there is also divergence. The expansion of ECEC programs and services for young children is uneven across welfare states. Some governments remain reluctant to invest public resources in ECEC programs (see Table 3 ). Some spend a greater percentage of GDP on child care programs and others on ECE programs. Some governments target ECEC services and others make them universally available, leading to higher overall provision rates (see Table 4 ). While some governments contract service delivery to private actors (for-profit and not-for-profit service providers), others deliver the services through public agencies such as schools and municipalities (see Table 5 ).
Whether such expansion in funding and supply is indicative of paradigm changereflecting a change in governments' overall goals, policy instruments used to obtain those goals, and the precise settings of those instruments (Hall, 1993) -is still subject to debate. Nevertheless, something is happening, particularly in liberal welfare states, to spur policy changes. The first part of this chapter examines the origins of new ECEC ideas and documents the process of alternate paradigm construction that is underway, mainly at the international level amongst transnational actors and international organizations. This chapter argues that transformations in ECEC policies signal the emergence of new ideas about desirable ECEC policies but those variations across liberal welfare states-Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom, and the United States 2 -in ECEC provision and funding indicate that the emergence of a new ECEC paradigm in these jurisdictions is not yet complete.
The second part of the chapter examines the curious outlier of Canada. While other liberal welfare states are increasing significantly their ECEC investment in some manner, Canada, outside of Quebec, 3 has remained stubbornly resistant. In seeking explanations for English Canadian resistance to the new alternate paradigm, the chapter highlights the institutional and ideational barriers encountered by political actors supportive of new ECEC ideas. Federalism posed an institutional constraint when provincial political officials were unconvinced of the need for new policies. Ideational barriers included a lack of scientific and economic consensus on the necessity of ECEC programs to address demographic, labour market, and educational challenges. As well, traditional norms regarding women's roles in the family remain powerfully persuasive politically and help explain societal resistance to non-parental forms of care for young children. The chapter thus highlights both the potential for paradigmatic change as well as the points of resistance in ECEC policy.
The next two sections document the observed changes in ECEC policy provision in recent decades and the explanatory factors driving the introduction of new policy ideas. The section following then documents the ideational changes that have occurred in Canada and the institutional and ideological factors preventing these new ideas from being institutionalized.
ECEC Policy Development
Until the 1960s when women began to enter the labour market in increasing numbers, formal child care services were scarce, other than for children from disadvantaged backgrounds, and often to encourage the employment of women on public assistance (Lewis, 1992; Gauthier, 1996; O'Connor, Orloff, and Shaver, 1999) . Furthermore, Barnett (1993, p. 520) notes that it was rare for pre-school children to attend formal educational programs or even to be cared for outside the home for more than a few hours per day.
By the late 1960s and early 1970s, however, a number of countries began to pass child care legislation (Gauthier, 1996, p. 108) and establish or expand public funding for child care and early childhood education services such as kindergartens. As Turgeon argues -The growing labour force participation of women and changes to the traditional, two-parent family structure…created a ‗crisis of care', contributing to a significant increase in demand for social care services whether from the state or the market‖ (Turgeon, 2009, ch. 2, p. 4) . In other words -post-industrial changes are increasingly challenging the assumptions on which the post-war welfare state was built‖ (Turgeon, 2009, ch. 2, p. 4) such as the sustainability of the male breadwinner/female caregiver model in light of an aging population and plunging fertility rates 4 in a number of European and East Asian countries that requires economies to expand their labour pool (Daly, 2007) , and increased numbers of single-parent families living in poverty (Gornick and Meyers, 2003) .
Still, by the end of the 1980s, very few states had large numbers of children ages zero to three in formal child care settings, and liberal welfare states had limited ECE programs for children ages three to compulsory school age, although quite a few continental European countries had extensively developed ECE services, including many non-Nordic countries such as Belgium, France, and Italy. These programs were often offered on a part-time basis (e.g. Germany), but some were full-time (e.g. Belgium, France) (Gornick and Meyers, 2003, pp. 230-231) . Starting in the late 1980s, countries increasingly provided child care and ECE programs, and increasingly on a full-time basis (OECD, 2006, pp. 80-81) . The OECD (2006, p. 104 ) also notes that countries with comparatively low public expenditure on children's services in the past, such as Ireland, Portugal, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, have especially increased spending.
Measuring Paradigm Change in ECEC Provision
Comparative research on ECEC provision often analyzes broad cross-national data such as overall patterns of child care and ECE provision (e.g. Daly and Rake, 2003) in order to determine the extent of cross-national policy change, general shifts in societal norms regarding work and family, and the respective roles of states, markets and families in providing care. Jensen (2008) , for example, explores the extent of ECEC norm change using two quantitative measures: percentage change in public expenditure on child care and ECE services over time; and the extent to which a country's curriculum tradition emphasizes school readiness rather than social pedagogical tradition (discussed further below). But tracking the scope and nature of ECEC policy change is not easily done by looking at broad policy indicators, such as levels of public spending as a percentage of GDP, overall provision rates, or a country's traditional policy emphasis. For example, a country's overall spending on ECEC may be low compared to other policy areas but that may mask significant new investment, or mask significant shifts in instrument choice. As well, overall levels of provision (that is, what percentage of children are using services) reveal little about the kinds of services in place, the mandate (educational or otherwise) of those services, and so on. Finally, coding countries' traditional curriculum emphases may not capture the quite radical shifts in both thinking and resultant policies witnessed recently in a number of countries.
Measuring the extent to which the scope and substance of these policy changes are indicative of paradigm change thus requires looking beyond broad policy indicators, such as levels of public spending as a percentage of GDP, overall provision rates, or changes in administrative authority. As Kamerman (2000) argues, we have to look at a number of other indicators that draw our attention to the beliefs about the appropriate roles of states, markets and families in program provision including ownership and agent responsible for delivery; funding strategies and targets; age group served; quality and effectiveness indicators; and accountability measures useful to maintaining quality and other policy goals. On the basis of these and other indicators, the changes witnessed are a lot less extensive than the broader policy indicators reveal (White, 2008) but are still significant enough as to warrant social scientific investigation. Table 5 identifies some distinguishable patterns in ECEC provision. As of the mid-2000s, variation can be seen first in norms regarding the appropriate age at which children should be attending school on a compulsory basis (ranging from age five in Hungary, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and the UK, to age six in most other liberal and conservative welfare states, as well as Finland and Iceland, and to age seven in the rest of the Nordic welfare states and Poland); and second, the extent to which the state should be responsible for educating, socializing and funding care for children prior to their entry to compulsory school. Governments in liberal welfare states still tend to conceive of public services for children ages zero to four as -care‖ rather than -education‖ to be delivered mainly through markets for those other than the neediest.
Yet, it is in the liberal welfare states where some of the greatest growth in public funding (though not necessarily public delivery) is occurring, particularly in ECE provision. Table 3 reveals that the UK and USA stand out as unlikely leaders amongst the liberal welfare states in terms of state expenditure on ECEC programs, Quebec stands out as a leader on child care spending, and the -Rest of Canada‖ stands out as an unlikely laggard given government spending in other social policy areas. The proportionately higher spending on ECE programs especially in the UK and USA compared to other liberal welfare states does not seem to be congruous with these countries' spending on primary and secondary education which appears typical of other liberal welfare regimes.
What Accounts for Changing ECEC Provision?
The literature on policy paradigm change has identified necessary conditions for an alternate paradigm to replace an existing one. Scholars have signalled the role of crisis and perception of failure of the existing paradigm (Hall, 1993; Walsh, 2000; Wilson, 2000) ; the existence of an alternate paradigm that is politically, economically and administratively viable (Hall, 1989) ; and a shift in the locus of authority or governing coalition to put in power supporters of the alternate paradigm (Hall, 1993) . The shift from Keynesianism to Monetarism, for example, occurred as a result of a perceived failure of the old paradigm as well as the perceived viability--politically, economically and administratively-of the alternative (Hall, 1989) , often as a result of a shifting governing coalition or a new venue that emerges (Walsh, 2000) .
Paradigm change is an intensely political process so that the strategies of political actors are hugely important to its outcome. Some scholars also highlight the role of discoursessystems of communication linked by an underlying logic (Ferree and Merrill, 2000, p. 455 ) -and strategic frames (that is, persuasive devices) in shaping the content of policy responses (Surel, 2000; Payne, 2001) . Schmidt (2008) notes that discourses and frames have to be tailored to the political-institutional context in order to be successful. Recent research investigates the influence of policy emulation of powerful players (Weyland, 2006; Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett, 2008) . Internationalization of domestic policy-making via a policy role for international organizations and transnational policy actors can also shift the locus of policy making and provide more sources of policy ideas (Mahon and McBride, 2008; Orenstein, 2008) . And finally, Pierson (2000) notes the importance of timing and particular sequencing of events as important factors affecting the persuasiveness of policy ideas.
The ideational literature thus suggests the importance of a number of interrelated factors that can help goad policy change (e.g. Haas, 2008) . I identify the importance of four interrelated factors influencing ECEC policy change:
Perception of a crisis to disrupt standard operating procedures
The policy paradigm literature points to the role of exogenous shocks and other -elements of rupture‖ (Surel, 2000, p. 503 ) that can lead to policy change, such as economic globalization. One important factor prompting public investment in ECEC services appears to have been a change in the way countries approach the issue of economic productivity. As Jenson and SaintMartin (2003, p. 93) argue, -All countries are currently engaged in redesigning their welfare architecture and citizenship regimes‖ 5 to reflect a social investment model of welfare state program delivery out of concern that, under globalization, states will not be able to compete without a highly skilled workforce. This social investment model entails investing in human capital development policies that will ensure that all adults are productive participants in a competitive and globalized economy.
The belief in the need to be competitive in a globalized world of free-flowing capital ties in with human capital development arguments that labour markets need to be flexible and adaptable. That knowledgeable and adaptable workforce is necessary because, as EspingAndersen (2002, p. 28) argues, -the only real asset that most advanced nations hold is the quality and skills of their people‖; thus industrialized economies depend more and more on being able to -mobilize the productive potential of those who today are children‖ (ibid.). If schools fail to create that workforce, then a government needs to adopt strategies and policies to make sure its workforce adapts such as through job retraining. But research has pointed out that -remedial policies once people have reached adulthood are unlikely to be effective unless these adults started out with sufficient cognitive and social skills. A social investment strategy directed at children must [therefore] be a centerpiece of any policy for social inclusion‖ (Esping-Andersen, 2002, p. 30) .
Given the belief in the importance of a highly skilled and highly educated workforce to compete in an increasingly globalized economy, how countries perform on cross-national educational assessments has thus become increasingly important in swaying policy opinion. Since the introduction of the US Department of Education's Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS), and especially since 2000 with the introduction of the OECD's Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA), cross-national benchmarking in educational performance has been possible. The results of those assessments reveal that Canada and Australia perform consistently above average, indeed, near the top of the international rankings, whereas the USA performs consistently at or below average on both PISA and TIMSS. The results for New Zealand and the UK vary. In the 1999 TIMSS results, New Zealand and England performed similarly to the USA (that is, average) on mathematics achievement of eighth-graders, but while New Zealand and the USA performed similarly average on science achievement, England performed above average and similarly to Australia and Canada (IES, 2008) . On PISA assessments, however, New Zealand performs consistently well above average, similar to Australia and Canada, whereas the UK performs poorly (although not as poorly as the USA which ranks at or below average among the participating countries) (see Table 6 ).
Countries that perform relatively poorly on these international rankings, such as the UK and USA, are likely to be more willing to invest public funding in early childhood education as a means to improve student test scores. And certainly some of the greatest increases in ECE programs are occurring in the UK and USA. New Zealand's investment in free ECE services for all families seems to disprove that hypothesis. However, New Zealand ‗s dissatisfaction with its extremely poor performance on the 1995 TIMSS assessment (Statistics New Zealand, 1998, pp. 30-31) may have prompted its government to invest in ECE. Surel (2000, p. 508) notes that -Far from making a clean slate with the past, a new societal paradigm must in effect be composed of previous cognitive and normative structures…‖ To Jenson (2004; and others (e.g. Jenson and Saint-Martin, 2003) , the ideas documented above-which focus on social investment-are part and parcel of a neoliberal paradigm that flows logically from liberal ideas that came before. Rather than designing policies and programs to support the traditional male breadwinner-female caregiver and the long-term unemployed, these new policies encourage all adults to participate actively in the labour market. Governments increasingly pay attention to and eliminate the factors that prevent adult labour market participation (such as caregiving responsibilities, illiteracy and poor training, poverty, and so on). Child care services thus provide an important means of ensuring parents' full time labour market participation, reducing social exclusion and labour shortages.
Congruence of new ideas with dominant paradigms
In addition, Dobrowolsky and Jenson (2004; see also Jenson, 2004) argue that children, rather than adult wage-earners, have become the logical and legitimate subjects of a social investment strategy. Children are the core of this social investment strategy from both a population health and human capital development perspective. By investing in ECEC services, governments not only provide the means to allow parents to participate in the labour market, as well as balance work and family life and stave off poverty and social exclusion, but they also prepare all children for the future so that they can be productive adults themselves (Jenson, 2006, pp. 36-37) . As Esping-Andersen et al. (2002, p. 20) articulate the argument, -The quality of childhood matters ever more for subsequent life chances‖ because -It is in childhood that citizens acquire most of the capital that they, later, will activate in the pursuit of a good life.‖
Privileged body of knowledge embodied in experts using appropriate policy frames
Not only is the content of ideas important but so too are the carriers. Haas (1989, p. 384, n. 20) and other constructivist scholars stress the important role of an epistemic community: a -community of experts sharing a belief in a common set of cause-and-effect relationships as well as common values to which policies governing these relationships will be applied.‖ The scientific grounding of some policy areas privileges the voices of experts such as economists, developmental psychologists, doctors, even neuroscientists, as opposed to traditional policy actors such as child care advocates and feminist advocacy groups. Haas (2004, p. 575 ) argues these experts' professions carry esteem -and thus command the greatest social legitimacy and deference when providing policy advice.‖ The weight of scientific or economic authority, the perceived degree of autonomy and independence of experts from politics, and the fit of proposed solutions with human capital development concerns, make ideas carried by an epistemic community more persuasive in overcoming traditional resistance to these programs, particularly in liberal welfare states without a strong tradition of support for public ECEC programs.
Institutionalization of knowledge and expertise in authoritative offices
Agency-centred analyses of the mainly US-based ECE policy expansion assert that policy change is largely the result of advocates, namely well-endowed lobbyists and skilled -framers‖ of the policy debates that exist outside of government but who are successfully using their organizational resources to persuade policy makers to act (e.g. Fuller, 2007; Imig, 2006; Imig and Meyer, 2007; Kirp, 2007) . Other recent research on the US-experience suggests, however, that organized interests and policy entrepreneurs may not have as great an ability to sway policy makers as other researchers believe; there may be no connection between scientific consensus as to -best practices‖ and the policies that emerge within a jurisdiction; and governments may play a stronger role in determining the scope and nature of pre-kindergarten policies than research suggests (e.g. Haskins, 2005; Phillips and McCartney, 2005; Bushouse, 2007) . Furthermore, Haas (2004, p. 572 ) notes that -we shouldn't assume that all organizations are rational and will automatically recognize and adopt what prove to be the appropriate policy responses.‖ As Haas (2004, p. 571) argues from analysis of climate change policy, -science is seldom directly converted to policy. The path from truth to power is a circuitous route at best.‖ -Usable‖ knowledge must thus find some way through the hallways of power. Key is that the knowledge is seen as -accurate and politically tractable for its users‖ (Haas, 2004, p. 574) . It must be credible (that is, believed to be true); believed to be legitimate and -developed through a process that minimizes the potential for bias‖; and salient, that is, presented in a timely manner. In addition, -It must be capable of mobilizing sufficient political support to produce agreement,‖ -capable of generating solutions that can be implemented,‖ and -capable of generating solutions that are instrumental towards solving the problems for which they were designed‖ (Haas, 2004, p. 575) . It is also important that the knowledge be institutionalized in decision making bodies such as relevant bureaucracies (Walsh, 2000, p. 487) .
Canadian ECEC Policy Development
This section observes the policy changes that have occurred particularly in the 1993-2004 period federally under the Liberal governments of Prime Minister Jean Chrétien and Paul Martin. It finds that new ideas about the importance of early childhood education and care to human capital development have been influential in Canada as in other liberal welfare states, prompting the Martin government in particular to press for a national -early learning and child care‖ or ELCC system, even in the face of federal opposition party and some provincial government resistance. Those efforts were supported by a broader policy community in Canada advocating in support of these ideas, and were reinforced by a domestic and transnational epistemic community that have been influential because of the weight of scientific authority they carry. But, as documented below, these ideas also encountered resistance, slowing their adoption in Canada.
Federal involvement in child care support began with the introduction of the federal Canada Assistance Plan (CAP) in 1966. It provided provinces and territories with cost-shared funds to support the cost of child care for eligible low income families. Federal conditions determined eligibility, which applied to both service providers and parent-users. Although governments at the time conceptualized child care purely as part of employment support for low income families and not as an early learning program, the Royal Commission on the Status of Women in Canada recommended in 1970 that a national child care program should be conceived of more broadly than simply part of social assistance as set up under CAP, and should -be designed for all families who need it and wish to use it‖ (Canada, Royal Commission on the Status of Women, 1970, p. 270) .
The Canadian federal government began to talk seriously about federal funding for a national child care program in the 1980s. Before its defeat in 1984, the Liberal government under Pierre Trudeau appointed the Ministerial-level Task Force on Child Care (1986). The new Conservative government led by Brian Mulroney established a Special Parliamentary Committee on child care, and then tabled the Canada Child Care Act (Canada, House of Commons, 1988) . The legislation died when Prime Minister Mulroney called the 1988 federal election and the Conservative government did not revisit child care policy again after its re-election. In 1993, the federal Liberal party under Jean Chrétien campaigned to spend $720 million on child care over three years and to create up to 50,000 new regulated spaces per year for three years, but added two caveats to its election platform promise: spaces would only be created in a year following a year of three per cent economic growth; and the program would be introduced only with the agreement of the provinces (Liberal Party of Canada 1993, pp. 38-40) . As a result of slow economic growth, that election promise was not fulfilled. Instead, after the 1995 Quebec referendum, the federal government pledged in its 1996 Throne Speech that it would -not use its spending power to create new shared-cost programs in areas of exclusive provincial jurisdiction without the consent of a majority of the provinces.‖ It also stated that -any new program will be designed so that non-participating provinces will be compensated, provided they establish equivalent or comparable initiatives‖ (Canada, House of Commons, 1996, p. 4) .
By the end of the 1990s, the federal government looked to be getting out of the business of funding national social service delivery, although it agreed in 1997 to the introduction of the National Child Benefit income supplement program. Surprisingly then, in 2000, the Chrétien government negotiated the Federal-Provincial-Territorial Agreement on Early Childhood Development (ECDA). Signed by all provinces except Quebec in September 2000, it provided federal transfer funds in the amount of $2.2 billion over five years, beginning in 2001-2002 to help provincial and territorial governments improve and expand early childhood development programs and services in four priority areas: healthy pregnancy, birth and infancy; parenting and family supports; early childhood development, learning and care; and community supports (CICS, 2000) . Then, in an effort to direct monies more explicitly to child care programs, in Before its defeat in December 2005, the federal Liberal government under Paul Martin negotiated with the provinces to spend an additional $5 billion over five years to build a national early learning and child care (ELCC) system. Prime Minister Martin was honouring a Liberal pledge in the 2004 election campaign (Liberal Party of Canada, 2004, p. 29) . As Friendly and White (2007, p. 189) argue, -Getting agreement from the provinces to spend the $5 billion on building a national early learning and child care system became one of the defining issues of the Martin minority government.‖ The federal-provincial agreements that were signed were cancelled by the Conservative minority government elected in January 2006.
Explaining ECEC Policy Change in Canada
Had the Martin Liberal government returned to office in January 2006, existing intergovernmental ECEC agreements would have been maintained and more would likely have followed. A paradigm change in ECEC in Canada then might have occurred. It is therefore worth asking why the federal Liberal government invested so much political capital into achieving these three agreements. The answer to this question lies with the Prime Minister himself. 6 One could argue that Paul Martin was already predisposed to ECEC because of his interest in human capital development, including -education, training, and research and development‖ (Delacourt, 2003, p. 76) . Martin was one of the authors of the 1993 Liberal election platform (Red Book) which contained a -qualified reference to early childhood learning‖ [reference] and the explicit child care promise. One individual interviewed by the author of this chapter stated that it was Chrétien, not Martin, who requested the growth conditions be put in regarding child care expansion out of budgetary concerns, given how poorly the economy was performing. In his 1996 budget speech, amidst the further cuts to federal budgets, and one year after the dismantling of CAP, Martin delivered what one individual interviewed by the author of this chapter referred to as -the education speech‖: as part of the strategy for -investing in our future‖, Martin announced programs to support students, including raising the limits on tuition credits and Registered Education Savings Plan contributions, and broadening eligibility for the federal Child Care Expense Deduction (CCED) to include students and single parents (Martin, 1996, p. 19 ). Prior to taking over the Liberal leadership in December 2003, Martin held a series of policy roundtables (about 12-15) covering various policy areas, one of which was ECEC policy. Thus, by the time Martin got to be the party leader, -he was primed‖ to embrace a national policy, not of -daycare‖ but as he clarified -early learning and child care.‖ 7 The question is, what did the priming?
International Organizations
Evidence suggests that international organizations and other internationalization phenomena such as economic globalization played a role in shaping the beliefs of key political actors, including Martin. As Pal (1996, pp. 369-370) reminds us, -domestic policy actors take their cues from [international] declarations and act in a myriad of ways to actualize them within their spheres of competence. Their work on hearts and minds may induce important value shifts.‖ I focus attention on the OECD because, while a number of IOs have increasingly paid attention to ECEC issues, the OECD has established the largest research program and has been most visible in the industrialized countries in promoting these policies (see e.g. OECD, 2001b , as well as the OECD's country notes and background reports on 20 countries). Mahon (2006, pp. 173-174, 179) observes that -the OECD operates as in important source of transnational policy knowledge construction and dissemination,‖ especially at times when -states are involved in a process of ‗unlearning' old policies…and learning new ones…‖ While the vision of a successful ECEC strategy offered in the 2001 Starting Strong report, and the specific recommendations outlined in the 2006 Starting Strong II report were not radical to some OECD countries, to many others, including Canada, that vision and those recommendations offered are radical, to say the least. Most liberal welfare states, for example, are far away from having established -a universal approach to access‖ as well as -substantial public investment in services and infrastructure‖ as the reports championed.
To illustrate how contrary the Starting Strong project was to traditional policy approaches in liberal welfare states in particular, we can examine why Canada was initially excluded from the initial round of country reviews.
8 When the OECD embarked on its country reviews in the late 1990s, it deliberately adopted the language of -early childhood education and care‖ as opposed to the language of -child care‖ which OECD reports and other studies had until then used (e.g. OECD, 1990; European Commission Childcare Network, 1990 ; European Commission Network on Childcare, 1995. -Child care‖, however, did not accurately capture the range of formal services that existed in many OECD countries for children under the age of compulsory school, nor did it fully capture the educational thrust behind its research agenda. When the Education Directorate of the OECD contacted country governments to ask them to be part of the review, government officials from Human Resources and Development Canada declined. They pointed out that education was a provincial responsibility. Then, when members of the Canadian delegation to the OECD's 2001 Early Childhood Education and Care: International Policy Issues Conference in Stockholm were successful in persuading the federal government to participate in the second round of reviews, HRDC Canada had difficulty persuading provincial governments to allow a federal government study in an area of provincial jurisdiction. In the end, only four provinces hosted site visits by the OECD review team: British Columbia, Manitoba, Prince Edward Island, and Saskatchewan (OECD, 2004) .
Thus, one of the significant impacts of the OECD project in Canada may have been to help link early childhood education and child care in the minds of Canadian federal and provincial policy officials and to draw attention to the need to link child care and education services administratively (although federalism concerns prevent those linkages from being made across levels of government). As Porter and Webb (2007) argue, through its knowledge production function, the OECD is also engaged in norm creation.
The other useful part of the OECD exercise was highlighting cross-national policy trends, with the implication being that there are leaders and laggards. The power of the OECD thus lies in its peer review function (Pagnani, 2002) . As Pagani (2002, p. 6 ) argues, -Peer pressure does not take the form of legally binding acts, as sanctions and other enforcement mechanisms. Instead, it is a means of soft persuasion which can become an important driving force to stimulate the State to change, achieve goals and meet standards.‖ OECD officials interact with country officials during the process of peer review, which can influence those officials' thinking. Peer review can also lead to -peer pressure‖ where the level of public scrutiny exercised during the process and after completion, along with the rankings that are often generated among countries, and domestic media attention and public opinion shifts can pressure change (Pagnani, 2002, p. 5) .
The OECD study was the first to highlight discrepancies in ECEC provision between liberal welfare states and those of continental Europe. Its two OECD studies with country background reports and country notes allowed policy researchers and advocacy organizations to highlight Canada's comparatively poor performance (e.g. Friendly, Beach, Ferns, and Turiano, 2007) . In countries where governments tend to be much more willing to borrow policy ideas from other jurisdictions, including IOs, shaming can resonate amongst domestic policy officials, and be picked up by advocacy groups and the media. Indeed, while Canada and the USA were both chastised as laggards in the OECD (2001b) report, the Canadian media gave this description much greater play than did the American media.
9 However, as Pagani (2002, pp. 12-13) argues, for peer review and peer pressure to be effective, there must be -convergence among the participating countries on the standards or criteria against which to evaluate performance‖ and there must be mutual trust and credibility in the examiners chosen to conduct the review. One Canadian journalist, questioned the credentials of those who conducted Canada's review. Wente (2004, p. A19) claimed that the country note was written by -two of Canada's leading daycare lobbyists.‖ Although the statement was incorrect, it undermined the credibility of the international team of examiners. 10 One individual interviewed by the author of this chapter also reported that the final version of the OECD country note required -some negotiation and massage‖; the first version of the Country Note was much harsher, especially with regard to ECEC services for aboriginal peoples in Canada, but it was reworked because federal and provincial governments were in the midst of negotiating policy changes.
11 All of these factors may have contributed to lessen peer pressure as a result.
Domestic Epistemic Community
Although the OECD's work appears to have helped shape the domestic policy debate, a great deal of policy work had been done much earlier in Canada to persuade policy makers to act, at least at the federal government level. The OECD's country report on Canada was published in October 2004, but it had been completed a few years earlier) and had circulated in Ottawa for a long time prior to its publication. It had been brought to Martin's attention by a member of his staff who had been a former special adviser to the Secretary-General of the OECD, as well as by a member of his cabinet. An individual interviewed by the author described the OECD report as -one of the ‗proof points' to describing the need‖ in Canada for a national program but a domestic epistemic community operating within centralized, executive-dominated Westminster parliamentary system has been very effective in transmitting ideas to the highest levels of political office in Canada. It has achieved greater (though so far fleeting) policy success than the pre-kindergarten network in the decentralized and fragmented decision making environment of the USA (Fuller, 2007; Kirp, 2007) .
A number of individuals interviewed for this project emphasized that the scientific underpinnings of arguments as well as the grounding of the ideas in human capital development concerns was -very important, especially at the early stages‖ in persuading policy makers to act. Some interviewees emphasized that certain credible actors championing scientific ideas were also key to -countering the ideologues of the world.‖ One interviewee claimed that much of the credit for Prime Minister Martin's conversion to ECEC champion was accomplished by Dr. Fraser Mustard, founding President of the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIAR, now CIFAR) and friends of Fraser Mustard. Other interviewees highlighted the importance of leaders connected to the business community. Other members of the domestic epistemic community included politicians such as Liberal MPP John Godfrey, elected in 1993 and chair of the House of Commons subcommittee on children and youth at risk for much of the Chrétien government years (and one of the -friends of Fraser Mustard).
The work of the CIFAR appears to have been especially influential. Godfrey argues his own -conversion‖ occurred when he was a journalist and editor at the Financial Post and came across Mustard's work. The CIFAR was established in 1982 to create an international multidisciplinary network of scholars working on complex problems of scientific, economic and social significance. One of its earliest projects was a population health program which ran from 1987-2003 and which explored social determinants of health. CIAR's human development program, which ran from 1993-2003, stemmed directly from the population health program to look at social factors that affect not just health but also development, including child development. Some of the leading population health and child development researchers in the country were affiliated with CIAR's projects. All became -friends of Fraser Mustard‖ and academic champions of the need for early child development programs.
In addition to CIFAR's research work, Dr. Mustard has been personally influential as the co-chair with Margaret McCain of the Government of Ontario's Early Years study (McCain and Mustard, 1999 ; see also the follow-up report McCain, Mustard and Shanker, 2007) . Mustard also coauthored a report with Frances Picherack (2002) for the Government of British Columbia on the state of early child development in the province. Leading members of the business and financial community, including Charles Coffey, executive vice-president, government and community affairs, RBC Financial Group (Coffey, 2003) , and David Dodge, former deputy minister of the federal department of finance, and then governor of the Bank of Canada, credit Mustard's CIAR work as -instrumental in expanding the frontiers of our knowledge in this area‖ (Dodge, 2003, p. 4) . Coffey was also the co-chair of the Commission on Early Learning and Child Care for the City of Toronto with Margaret McCain (Coffey and McCain, 2002) .
John Godfrey was a principal architect of change within the federal Parliament. As an MP, Godfrey served as Chair of the National Children's Agenda Caucus Committee, Chair of the National Liberal Caucus Social Policy Committee, and Chair of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Children and Youth at Risk, among other portfolios. Before being elected in 1993, Godfrey played a small role in writing the 1993 Liberal Red Book (Delacourt, 2003, p. 79) , whose major authors included Martin, as well as current CIFAR President and CEO Chaviva M. Hošek, Eddie Goldenberg, and Terrie O'Leary, who later went on to serve as Canada's representative to the World Bank and to promote her interests in education (Delacourt, 2003, p. 74, 76, 126) . Peter Nicholson, former senior policy advisor in the Government of Canada, provincial MPP and Liberal finance critic in Nova Scotia, and then Senior VicePresident with the Bank of Nova Scotia, and Lester Thurow, MIT economist, also weighed in on the platform at the fall 1991 Liberal conference in Alymer, Quebec (Delacourt, 2003, p. 74) . The election of the Liberals in 1993 led to the importing of those ideas regarding productivity and human capital development to the highest levels of government.
Godfrey and Nicholson, the latter who became the federal Liberals' -resident brain‖ and served as the Clifford Clark Visiting Fellow in the Finance Department in 1994-1995 (Delacourt, 2003, p. 86 (White, 2008) , and Canada was one of the countries under review in the early 2000s. The OECD completed its country report in 2002 (although its publication was delayed until October 2004) and the report was circulating in Ottawa for a long time prior to its publication. Nicholson and Godfrey brought the report to Martin's attention. Its effect in Ottawa, one interviewee noted, was to act as -one of the ‗proof points' to describing the need‖ in Canada for a national ECEC program.
People in Prime Minister Chrétien's policy shop were also sympathetic to the idea of early child development -after all, the Chrétien Liberals introduced the Canada Prenatal Nutrition Program in 1994, implemented the Community Action Program for Children (CAPC) in 1994, and established Aboriginal Head Start in 1995 (Doherty, 2007) -but were cautious about major monetary commitments. The evidence presented by the domestic epistemic community of the importance of ECD for human capital development and social equity as well as the benefits for parental labour market participation, thus played a big role in convincing the federal government to act, first through the instrument of the ECD agreement and then, under the championing of Jane Stewart, the Multilateral Framework Agreement on child care. Universal early childhood education and care programs were front and centre in the broader policy discussion on early childhood development (see, e.g. National Liberal Caucus Social Policy Committee, 2002).
One interviewee stated that the human capital development and women's labour market equality rationales resonated most strongly amongst senior policymakers as justification for a national ELCC program, although different people had different reasons for supporting the policies and programs. The interviewee confirmed, though, that a national system of early learning and child care was not conceived of simply as an anti-poverty measure or solely a part of human capital development but rather something broader. In fact, other actors in Ottawa such as Senator Landon Pearson, appointed by the Chrétien government to the Senate in 1994, and who worked with Godfrey on the National Children's Agenda Caucus Committee, championed ECEC as part of a broader children's rights agenda based on Canada's ratification of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. The election of Claudette Bradshaw in 1997, who in 1974 founded the Moncton Headstart Early Family Intervention Centres, and who became Minister of Labour and Minister Responsible for Homelessness in the second Chrétien term, also added to the parliamentary -bench strength‖ on these issues. As one interviewee stated, the scientific research was useful to present when critics tried to reduce ECEC to babysitting.
Evidence that these ideas resonated amongst both federal and provincial officials lies in the fact that Social Development Canada Minister Ken Dryden managed to execute a series of bilateral agreements with all provinces including Quebec to spend an additional $5 billion over five years (beyond the $900 million already committed through the MFA) to build a national system of early learning and child care based on the QUAD principles: Quality, Universality, Accessibility, and Developmental[ly-focused] programs. In the earlier MFA agreement signed in 2003, all provinces (except Quebec) had agreed to spend federal funds on regulated programs only and had agreed to report annually to Canadians on -descriptive and expenditure information‖ using QUAD-based indicators of availability, affordability and quality (CICS 2003) . In each of the Agreements-in-Principle (AIPs) signed in 2005, the provinces agreed to provide a general outline along similar lines as the MFA (Mahon, 2006) of how the funds were to be used and to develop a more specific Action Plan for the five-year phase, after which the provincial and federal government would sign a funding agreement. However, when the federal Liberal government fell at the end of 2005 on a non-confidence motion, only two provinces, Manitoba and Ontario, had finished the process; Quebec and the federal government had already signed a five year funding agreement without an AIP because Quebec's ELCC program was already much more advanced; and seven AIPs were in various stages of progress (Friendly and White 2007) . The subsequent loss of the 2006 election highlights the lack of institutionalization these alternative policy ideas.
Constraints on Policy Paradigm Change
Institutional Stickiness
Federalism clearly plays a major role in slowing the pace of paradigmatic change in Canada, a constraint that unitary liberal welfare states such as New Zealand and the United Kingdom do not face. The federal Liberal government is constrained, for example, by jurisdictional issues surrounding federal funding for explicitly educational programs. Whereas the federal government had some role in child care financing after the introduction of the Canadian Assistance Plan in 1966 Plan in (cancelled in 1996 , and it has provided some funding for higher education, it has never spent money on children -who have crossed the threshold to primary and secondary school.‖ In fact, one interviewee confirmed that the federal government used the language of -early learning and child care‖ rather than the OECD standard of -early childhood education and care‖ because it was sensitive to the fact that the provinces have exclusive authority over primary and secondary education and, unlike other social policy areas, primary and secondary education remains a jurisdictionally watertight compartment. -Learning‖ is considered a broader term that can encompass non-school-based educational programs.
In fact, many provinces were very reluctant to agree to the OECD's country review of Canada's ECEC programs, questioning whether the Government of Canada could participate in research in an area of provincial jurisdiction. In the end, only four provinces participated in the OECD country review: British Columbia, Manitoba, Prince Edward Island, and Saskatchewan (OECD, 2004) . In the absence of a national crisis in educational performance, it is likely that these ECE jurisdictional battles will continue.
Within provincial governments, little reform of the administrative apparatus to deliver these programs has occurred. Although there are some exceptions, responsibility for child care and education generally still largely rests with two different ministries, usually the Ministry of Education for kindergarten and either a Ministry of Health and Community and Social Services or Children's Services for child care (Friendly et al., 2007, pp. 195-197) .
Political Resistance
The 2006 election revealed that the Liberal government had not had sufficient time to reframe national ELCC policy discourse in order to institutionalize (and insulate) the bilateral agreements. Instead, the 2006 federal election campaign sparked a maelstrom of public debate and newspaper commentary regarding the desirability of non-parental care (see Friendly and White, 2007) with the Conservative leader Stephen Harper promising to cancel the recently negotiated child care agreements and promising to introduce his own -universal child care‖ program (which resembled in fact a federal family allowance). The federal Liberals pledged to make the ELCC agreements permanent in the 2006 election campaign (Liberal Party of Canada, 2006) , while the Conservatives pledged to end the bilateral ELCC agreements after one year, and to instead introduce a $1,200 taxable allowance for each child under age six (Conservative Party of Canada 2006, p. 31). The Conservatives followed through on both pledges once they assumed office in February 2006 . The popularity of the universal -child care‖ benefit made opposition parties hesitant to attack it in the 2008 federal election. The vagaries of the election cycle thus brought a halt to reforms in Canada, whereas the Blair government in the UK had three terms in office to secure its policy reforms, the Howard government four terms in Australia
Lack of a Scientific Consensus as to the Necessity of ECEC Programs
As discussed in earlier sections of the paper, concerns about creating a skilled workforce are leading many countries to embrace public funding if not public delivery of pre-school services.
The changes are most profound in some liberal welfare states, particularly the UK and USA, which perform badly on cross-national educational assessments. Continental European and East Asian welfare states, in contrast, facing demographic challenges and related labour market shortages are increasingly turning to child care programs to encourage both women's labour market participation and higher birth rates.
In Canada (and to some extent Australia) -PISA complacency‖ as opposed to -PISA shock‖ could explain why there is less domestic outcry for early childhood education programs than in the UK and USA. As Coulombe (2007) argues, Canada does well not just in terms of overall performance results in cross-national educational assessments but also on other measures such as educational equality of opportunity. That is, the gap between the performance of students from families with high socio-economic status versus low socioeconomic status was smaller in Canada on the 2003 PISA than in other industrialized countries. This outcome indicates that -the Canadian school system does a relatively good job of improving the skills of students with a low socio-economic background and, therefore, of reducing socio-economic disparities‖ (Coulombe, 2007 , p. 59, citing Bussière et al., 2004 . In addition, the percent of students ranked as -poor‖ performers on the 2003 PISA was lower in Canada than in every other country save for Finland. These outcomes suggest that -Canada might well have one of the best public education systems in the world for primary and secondary schooling‖ (Coulombe, 2007, p. 59) . In the absence of a perceived crisis, it may be hard to mobilize policy opinion in support of significant ECEC investment. In fact, half of the six judges on the Canadian-based Institute for Research on Public Policy's (IRPP) Canadian Priorities Agenda recommended against the adoption of a national early childhood development program because there was not enough evidence -to justify adopting a national template at this time‖ (Tuohy, 2007, p. 527) . Evidence that extremely vulnerable populations are not as prevalent in Canada (save for in aboriginal communities) as in the United States weakens arguments for universal programs.
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There is also an irony in the way that governments in Canada deliver ECEC services. Unlike governments in Australia, the UK, and the USA which have expanded supply of ECEC services in recent years by investing heavily in the ECEC market, governments in Canada retain some antipathy to the wholesale embracing of markets. Despite its relatively low levels of ECEC funding and provision, Canada stands out as a (positive) outlier among liberal welfare states for two reasons. First, most (but not all) provincial governments have accepted that if child care services are to be delivered by the private sector, the governance structure should be predominantly not-for-profit, rather than for-profit (see Friendly et al., 2007 for statistics) . Second, most provincial governments have (so far) accepted that if they are going to deliver early childhood education services, they should be provided through public schools. Thus, while Canada ranks lowest in the percentage of four-year-olds with access to publicly funded ECE services, it stands out as the only country 13 where those ECE services are predominantly delivered through public schools by trained teachers. This means that expansion of those services is more expensive.
Conclusion
This chapter has investigated the causal factors behind ECEC policy changes, as well as the points of resistance in Canada. It has argued that alternative policy ideas are emerging that challenge -taken-for-granted beliefs about what are possible and desirable public policies‖ (Introduction to this text) in the area of early childhood education and care. Certain policy actors are playing key roles in shifting thinking on childhood, the nature of learning, and the kinds of programs necessary for successful childhood and adult lives. International organizations, while not their creators, popularize the ideas that are bubbling up from the domestic (and increasingly transnational) epistemic communities. The scientific underpinnings of those policy ideas are crucial in persuading policy makers to act. Furthermore, international organizations and epistemic communities, as authoritative actors, provide the authoritative evidence that these policies are needed for a host of reasons including human capital development, social development, and gender equality. It is not yet clear whether these new ideas are evidence of the emergence of a new paradigm, but they certainly are contributing to policy changes and in particular public investment in ECEC services in liberal welfare states.
This chapter has also examined the puzzle of explaining Canada as an outlier when it comes to ECEC investment. It has argued that internationalized ideas have encountered barriers in the form of institutional and ideational stickiness in Canada. Key political decisions makers attempted to implement extensive ECEC investment in the 2000s but provincial governments acted as veto players as did federal opposition parties. Pockets of societal opposition to nonparental forms of care galvanized the federal Conservatives to reject federal-provincial-territorial plans for major ECEC investment; and the absence of an educational, employment, or demographic crisis creates resistance in the federal and some provincial bureaucracies to further ECEC investment. Analysis of ECEC provision thus contributes to our theoretical and empirical understanding of the factors that contribute to growth, shrinkage, or stagnation of contemporary welfare states and to the literature on what makes a paradigm successful. Esping-Andersen (1990, p. 27) includes Australia, Canada, and the United States as archetypical examples of liberal welfare states. Subsequent comparative research (e.g. Baker and Tippin, 1999; O'Connor, Orloff, and Shaver, 1999; Sainsbury, 1999; Daly and Rake, 2003; Kremer, 2007) that examine the gender dimensions of welfare regimes identify other liberalmimicking welfare states such as the UK, Ireland, the Netherlands and New Zealand, as well as and the East Asian welfare states of Japan and Korea (e.g. Esping-Andersen, 1997; Peng, 2002; Peng and Wong, 2008) . Tables 3 and 5 Strang and Chang (1993, p. 250 ) on the US's nonparticipation in international standard setting on social welfare through the ILO, and its refusal to sign the Kyoto Protocol. 10 The OECD's international team consisted of John Bennett from the OECD, Bea Buysse from Belgium, Païve Lindberg from Finland and Helen Penn from the UK (OECD, 2006, p. 438) . The background report, in contrast, as in all countries, was written by three in-country experts (Doherty, Friendly, and Beach, 2003) and was commissioned by the Government of Canada. 11 Pagani (2002, p. 13) states -The involvement of the reviewed State in the process and its ownership of the outcome of the peer review is the best guarantee that it will ultimately endorse the final report and implement its recommendations. However, the State's involvement should not go so far as to endanger the fairness and the objectivity of the review. For example, the State under review should not be permitted to veto the adoption of all or part of the final report.‖ 12 Although see Doherty (2007) on the problems of pinpointing vulnerable populations. 13 The state of Oklahoma similarly delivers its universal ECE program through public schools (Barnett et al., 2006) . Doherty, Friendly, and Beach (2003, pp. 73-80) and are from 2001 -the discrepancy with OECD (2006) is due to rounding down given that the estimates include children ages 6-12 as well; **data from OECD (2005, pp. 17, 109) and are from 2001. Compulsory schooling * Provision is largely publicly funded and managed (more than 50 per cent of enrolments are in publicly operated facilities). ** Provision is largely managed by private stakeholders (both for-profit and not-for-profit providers) and is publicly and privately financed. Source: OECD (2008b) 
